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Abstract
In this paper I study a new ampliﬁcation mechanism in search models that arises
when workers can choose to search on the job and, despite the fact that all workers are
ex-ante identical, employers prefer to hire already employed workers for endogenous
reasons. The motivation for on-the-job search in the model is job-shopping, where
workers look for jobs they ﬁnd appealing, and the appeal of a job to the worker is not
observed by the ﬁrm. In equilibrium, workers arriving from unemployment are more
likely to leave a job for a more appealing job, and, knowing this, ﬁrms prefer to hire
already employed, as opposed to unemployed, workers.
Employers’ preference for hiring already employed workers introduces a new am-
pliﬁcation mechanism into search models. This is because vacancies in the model with
such preference respond more to aggregate shocks than in the standard search model
due to the fact that employed workers reduce their search intensity in a recession,
thereby making it less attractive for ﬁrms to post vacancies. Using simulations of the
proposed model, I explore the extent that the presence of job-to-job transitions can
help in explaining the volatility of unemployment and vacancies over the business cycle
through this new ampliﬁcation mechanism. The simulation results show that, for stan-
dard parameter values, this new mechanism can generate ﬁve times more ampliﬁcation
compared to the baseline model.
1This paper was previously titled “Worker Reallocation over the Business Cycle: The Importance of
Job-to-Job Transitions, Part 2: Theory”.
2Department of Economics, Northwestern University, 2001 Sheridan Road, Evanston, IL 60208-2600,
USA. E-mail: nagypal@northwestern.edu1 Introduction
In this paper, I study a new ampliﬁcation mechanism in search models that arises when work-
ers can choose to search on the job and, despite the fact that all workers are ex-ante identical,
employers prefer to hire already employed workers. Such a preference arises endogenously
because the expected proﬁts from hiring an unemployed worker are lower than those from
hiring an employed worker. The reason for this is that workers hired from unemployment
have higher expected turnover as they are willing to accept even low quality matches and
then to continue to search on the job. Therefore, it is less proﬁtable for ﬁrms to undertake
the necessary investment needed to create employment relationships when the composition
of searchers shifts towards unemployed workers during a recession, thereby stiﬂing vacancy
creation during these bad times.
The innovation of this research is to construct a search model that incorporates on-the-
job search where, unlike in existing models of on-the-job search, employers prefer to hire
already employed workers. There is both direct and indirect evidence that such a preference
exists among employers, as argued in Eriksson and Lagerstr¨ om (2004) and Nagyp´ al (2004).
Moreover, as I show, it has the theoretical appeal that it can give an explanation why vacancy
creation is so low in recessions and why the resulting low job ﬁnding rate results in a burst
of unemployment.
The puzzle that this paper addresses is ﬂeshed out in detail in Shimer (2004), which is that
textbook search models have essentially no internal ampliﬁcation. The “standard” search
model results in an elasticity of unemployment and of vacancies with respect to shocks to
the productivity of employment relationships that is between .5 and 1.5, which is in sharp
contrast with the elasticities observed in the data, which are on the order of 10 for both
unemployment and vacancies.
Adding on-the-job search is a natural extension of the standard search model, especially in
light of recent empirical ﬁndings using direct measures of job-to-job transition rates that
argue that the extent of job-to-job movement has been underestimated using earlier indirect
1methods. Existing search models with on-the-job search (such as those developed by Pis-
sarides (1994), Mortensen (1994), Burdett and Mortensen (1998), and Barlevy (2002)) do
not help in resolving the ampliﬁcation puzzle, since they all involve a preference by ﬁrms
for hiring unemployed workers, as opposed to employed workers.3 This exacerbates the lack
of ampliﬁcation, as opposed to helping it, since it means that recessions are times when
the pool of searchers changes in favor of vacancy creation, thereby further worsening the
model’s ability to explain the lack of vacancy creation during recessions in the data. In
fact, for example, while Barlevy (2002) does not report the elasticity of unemployment to
productivity shocks in his model, it can be calculated from the numbers that he reports to
be below 0.10.
There are two channels through which preference for hiring unemployed workers arises in
existing models of on-the-job search. First, since the alternatives of unemployed workers are
worse on average than those of employed workers, they are more likely to accept a match of
a given quality or productivity. Second, depending on the nature of wage setting, employed
searchers have better outside options, thereby commanding higher wages than unemployed
searchers. In a standard search model ﬁrms prefer higher acceptance rates and lower wages,
thereby this means that they prefer unemployed searchers.
The key diﬀerence in the model developed in this paper is that ﬁrms do not always prefer
to hire workers with higher acceptance rates. For this to happen, what is necessary is that
some matches lead to a negative payoﬀ to the ﬁrm, thereby making the acceptance of such
matches undesirable. Such a negative payoﬀ at the time of the creation of the employment
relationship is not a feature of the standard search model, since, in that model, all costs
of creating a vacancy are born prior to meeting a worker through vacancy creation costs.
It is a natural extension to consider, however, that the ﬁrm has to expend some additional
resources (on training, relocation, and other match-speciﬁc investments) at the time the
match is formed. Of course, in order for ﬁrms to enter matches that lead to a negative
3It should be noted, however, that the emphasis of these authors have not been on the role of on-the-job
search in amplifying productivity shocks. A notable exception is Shimer (2003), who studies ampliﬁcation
with on-the-job search. The mechanism in his model is very diﬀerent from the one studied here, since he
departs in several ways from the standard search model, and argues that a preference for hiring unemployed
workers can help in resolving the ampliﬁcation puzzle.
2payoﬀ, it is necessary that the ﬁrm has less information about the match that is being
formed than the worker. This is naturally the case when the quality of the match is only
observed by the worker and enters directly only into the utility function of the worker.
Given these elements of the model, the basic mechanism is simple. Workers can undertake
job shopping at a cost both while unemployed and while employed, where job shopping
simply means searching for a match with a higher idiosyncratic value to the worker. Unem-
ployed workers are “desperate”, as they are willing to accept any idiosyncratic value above
some minimum threshold. Employed workers are more selective, and only accept matches
that have a value above the value of their current match. Turnover, in turn, declines with
the idiosyncratic value of the match for two reasons. First, the probability of ﬁnding a
better match declines, and second, as a consequence, the incentives to search for a better
job also decline, thereby leading to lower endogenous search eﬀort. This then means that
the expected turnover of previously unemployed workers is higher than that of previously
employed workers, making them less attractive candidates for ﬁrms to hire. Of course, this
higher turnover has to be weighed against the higher acceptance rate of unemployed workers.
It is easy to argue, as I do below, that the turnover eﬀect can outweigh the acceptance rate
eﬀect only if there is a possibility of the ﬁrm to make negative proﬁts in a match, which
naturally arises when the ﬁrm has no information about the idiosyncratic value of the match
to the worker and has to bear some one-time match-speciﬁc costs to start the relationship.
Ampliﬁcation then is a direct results of this mechanism. Vacancies in the model with a
preference for hiring employed workers respond more to aggregate shocks than in the stan-
dard search model due to the fact that employed workers reduce their search intensity in a
recession, thereby making it less attractive for ﬁrms to post vacancies.
Using simulations of the proposed model, I explore the extent that the presence of job-to-job
transitions can help in explaining the volatility of unemployment and vacancies over the
business cycle through this new ampliﬁcation mechanism. The simulation results show that
this new mechanism can generate 5 times more ampliﬁcation than the baseline model studied
in Shimer (2004).
3Finally, let us consider in some more detail how preference for employed workers can arise
in an extension of the standard search model. When contemplating vacancy creation, if the




where Π(µ) is the proﬁt from creating a job of type µ, Au(µ) is the probability that an
unemployed worker will accept a type µ job, and F(µ) is the distribution of new matches.
Correspondingly, the expected proﬁts from meeting an employed worker are
 
Π(µ)Ae(µ)dF(µ). (2)
Since Au(µ) ≥ Ae(µ) for all possible values of µ, if Π(µ) ≥ 0, then it is necessarily the case
that the expected proﬁts meeting an unemployed worker are at least as large as the expected
proﬁts from meeting an employed worker. Only if Π(µ) can become negative for some value
of µ is there a possibility for the expected proﬁts from meeting an unemployed worker to be
lower than those from meeting an employed worker. The elements introduced in this model
to allow for this possibility is a one-time start-up cost and asymmetric information.
42 Environment
Time is continuous and goes on forever. There is a unit measure of inﬁnitely-lived workers,
who are ex-ante identical. Workers can be either employed or unemployed, and the objective










wt + µt − c(st) if employed,
b − c(st) if unemployed.
(4)
Here wt is the wage received when employed at time t, µt denotes the attractiveness or
appeal to employed workers of their current employment match, in other words, workers
derive utility from being on a job they “like”, and st denotes the search eﬀort of the worker
at time t. The appeal of a job to the worker, µ (which I will also call match quality below),
is determined upon meeting a potential employer, and is drawn from the distribution F(·),
where F : [µ, ¯ µ] → [0,1] is a continuous, twice diﬀerentiable, strictly increasing distribution
function, and µ ∈ R ∪ {−∞} and ¯ µ ∈ R ∪ {∞}. In addition, workers can choose to engage





c0 + ˆ c(st) if st > 0
0 if st = 0
, (5)
where ˆ c(·) is a strictly increasing, strictly convex, twice continuously diﬀerentiable function.
This means that there is both a ﬁxed cost and a variable cost of searching, so that when
the incentives become suﬃciently low, the worker stops searching all together. Finally, b
denotes the constant utility ﬂow (derived from leisure and/or from unemployment insurance
beneﬁts) that a worker receives while unemployed.








   
   
0 if ﬁrm is inactive
−cv if ﬁrm is active with a vacant job






1 if a new match is created at time t
0 otherwise
(8)
This means that any ﬁrm can enter the market and become active by posting a vacancy at
ﬂow cost cv. If a ﬁrm posts a vacancy, then it participates in the matching market for creating
new matches. When a ﬁrm creates a match, it needs to pay a one-time match-speciﬁc start-
up cost of K, and then it receives a ﬂow proﬁt of p−wt until the match dissolves. Here p is
the output of a match, which is assumed to be the same for all matches. Matches dissolve
for exogenous reasons at rate δ and endogenously when the worker decides to form a new
employment relationship as a consequence of on-the-job search.
There is a single matching market with a meeting function determining the number of meet-
ings (mt) as a function of the total amount of search eﬀort of workers (st) and the number
of vacancies posted (vt):
mt = m(st,vt), (9)
such that ms(s,v) > 0, m(0,v) = 0 for any v, mv(s,v) > 0, m(s,0) = 0 for any s. I assume
that m(s,v) has constant returns to scale, so that the meeting rate per unit of search eﬀort
for workers can be written as










6where θt = vt
st is market tightness at time t. Similarly, the meeting rate for ﬁrms can be
written as












The timing of match formation is as follows. If a worker and a ﬁrm meet, the worker
observes the appeal of the potential match and can decide whether or not to form the
match. In order to form the match, an already employed worker needs to end his current
relationship. The relevance of this assumption is that it implies that the outside option of
all workers is unemployment.4 The ﬁrm does not observe neither the appeal of the match to
the worker nor whether the worker was previously unemployed or employed. If the worker
agrees to forming a match, then wages are determined upon the formation of the match
by splitting the expected surplus such that the worker receives β fraction of it. Wages are
subsequently renegotiated only if otherwise the participation constraint of the parties would
be violated conditional on the worker not being able to credibly communicate the existence
of a possibility to form a new match. Firms rationally form and update their beliefs about
the appeal of a job to the worker based on the information available to them.
It is worth commenting on the particular choice of the wage setting mechanism. While there
is no micro-foundation or axiomatic basis for the chosen wage-determination mechanism, it
is chosen to keep the model as close as possible to the standard search model that is studied
in Shimer (2004). Without asymmetric information and on-the-job search, Nash bargaining
implies the sharing of the surplus between the worker and the ﬁrm. Therefore, assuming
surplus sharing in the environment studied provides the most direct comparison with the
standard model. It would be worthwhile to study, and it is an issue I will consider in future
work, how departing from surplus sharing aﬀects the results reported below.
4An alternative way to justify unemployment being the outside option of all workers is to assume that
matches cannot be “recalled” and that there is scope for renegotiation between the worker and the ﬁrm
immediately after the worker has moved from the old employer to their current employer.
73 Equilibrium
3.1 Deﬁnition of stationary equilibrium
For the sake of simplicity, and to keep the analysis tractable, I consider what happens in
the above described economy in a stationary equilibrium. Clearly, given the assumptions
on wage-setting above, in a stationary equilibrium, the only new information that arrives
to a worker-ﬁrm pair while in a match is whether the match is still in existence or not,
therefore the only state variable that enters the asset values of workers and ﬁrms, besides
the wage and the quality of the match, is the length of the relationship. Let the value of
unemployment be U, the value of a worker employed in a match of quality µ, tenure τ, and
wage w be W(w,µ,τ), the value of a vacancy be V , and the value of employment for the
ﬁrm in a match of tenure τ and wage w be J(w,τ).
Deﬁnition 1. A recursive stationary search equilibrium is unemployment rate u, vacancy
rate v, asset values {U,V,W(w,µ,τ),J(w,τ)}, wage function w(τ), workers’ search decisions
s(w,µ,τ), and distribution of employed workers G(w,µ,τ) such that
• U and W(·) are the value of unemployment and of working for workers making optimal
matching, searching, and acceptance decisions given u,v, w(·), and G(·), and s(·) is
the corresponding optimal search policy.
• V and J(·) are the value of a vacancy and of a ﬁlled job for ﬁrms making optimal
vacancy creation and matching decisions given u,v, w(·), and G(·).
• Agents update their beliefs rationally.
• There is free entry of vacancies.
• Wages are determined by sharing of the expected surplus upon meeting and are subse-
quently renegotiated only if otherwise the participation constraint of the parties would
be violated.
• The distribution G(·) is consistent with the decisions of the agents in the economy.
83.2 Characterization of equilibrium
3.2.1 Wage determination
Let the expected value of a worker upon forming a match be
W0(w) =
  ¯ µ
0
W(w,µ,0)dH0(µ), (12)
where H0(µ) is the distribution of match quality at the formation of a match conditional on
the worker accepting the match, to be derived below. Similarly,
J0(w) =
  ¯ µ
0
J(w,0 | µ)dH0(µ), (13)
is the expected value of a ﬁrm upon forming a match, where J(w,0 | µ) is the value to the
ﬁrm from matching with a worker with match quality µ.
The wage is set such that
(1 − β)(W0(w) − U) = β (J0(w) − V ). (14)
Since the information that the wage is conditioned on is the same in all initial matches,
and all workers have the same outside option, there is a single initial wage in equilibrium.
Clearly, conditional on the worker having accepted the match, this initial wage satisﬁes the
participation constraint of both parties. Moreover, it is straightforward to show that wages
will never be renegotiated, since the initial wage will satisfy the participation constraint of
the agents at all future tenure conditional on the match having continued. This follows
from the fact that match continuation in the model is always favorable information to a
ﬁrm, meaning that the ﬁrm’s posterior belief improves as the match lasts longer and longer.
Formally, the lack of renegotiation follows from the lack of ﬁrm-initiated separations, as
stated in the proposition below, which is proved in the Appendix.
Proposition 2. If workers’ search decision has the reservation property, there are no ﬁrm-
initiated separations in a stationary equilibrium.
93.2.2 Worker side
Given that there is a unique wage in the stationary equilibrium as argued above, the wage w
and tenure τ can be dropped as state variables from the value of an employed worker. The




µ + w − c(s) + λ(θ)s








The ﬂow payoﬀ from working is the utility derived from being in a match of quality µ and
from the wage w. An employed worker needs to choose her search eﬀort, and if a new ﬁrm
is encountered, she needs to decide whether to form the new match given its quality µ′ that
is drawn from the distribution F, or to stay with her current employer. Moreover, at rate δ
the worker suﬀers a loss of asset value due to exogenous separation.




b − c(s) + λ(θ)s







An unemployed worker needs to also choose her search eﬀort, and if a ﬁrm is encountered,
she needs to decide whether to form the new match given its quality µ′ that is drawn from
the distribution F, or to remain unemployed.
Equation (15) deﬁnes a contraction, and therefore the Contraction Mapping Theorem implies
that W(µ) is increasing in µ and, given the assumptions on F(·) and c(·), diﬀerentiable except
at the points where the search decision changes discontinuously. This in turn implies that
acceptance decisions have the reservation property with the quality of the current match
being the reservation match quality.
Let us next turn to studying the worker’s search decision. Given the structure of the search
cost and using the reservation property of acceptance decisions, the worker’s decision problem






µ + w − c(s) + λ(θ)s




′) + δ(U − W(µ))
 
;
µ + w + δ(U − W(µ))}, (17)
where the search decision has been broken down into two steps: a decisions whether to search
at all, and a decision of how much to search if searching. I assume that the worker chooses
to search if she is indiﬀerent between searching and not searching. The ﬁrst-order condition
characterizing the second of these maximization problems is given by
c
′(s(µ)) = λ(θ)












where the second equality follows from integration by parts and ¯ F = 1 − F is the survival
function of the distribution F. With regards to the ﬁrst maximization problem, clearly, the
payoﬀ from search is declining with µ, hence the optimal policy with respect to whether
to search at all has the reservation property. This means that that there exists a µs above
which the worker will choose not to search at all and below which she will choose to search.
At µs, the condition of optimality states that
c(s(µs)) = λ(θ)s(µs)







From these two optimality conditions, and given the properties of c(·), the following Lemma
follows.
Lemma 3. There exists a µs, such that for all µ > µs, s(µ) = 0. Moreover, the optimal
search eﬀort of the worker, s(µ), is continuous and strictly declining in µ for all µ < µs.
In what follows, I assume that the variable part of the search cost function takes on the
form ˆ c(s) = c1s1+ρ, for some ρ > 0. Substituting in this functional form of c, Equations (18)























an equilibrium condition that determines µs as a function of λ(θ) and of exogenous parame-
ters.









r+δ+λ(θ)s(µ)(1−F(µ)) if µ < µs
1
r+δ if µ > µs
(22)
Substituting into the optimality condition for search for µ < µs, taking derivatives on both






r + δ + λ(θ)s(µ) ¯ F(µ)
 . (23)
This diﬀerential equation together with the boundary condition in (20) fully characterizes
the search decision of workers as a function of the quality of their match, and can be solved
numerically for any value of ρ > 0.
Notice that while W(µ) is continuous everywhere, there is a kink in the function W(µ) at µs,
since there is a positive diﬀerence between its derivative from the left (the ﬁrst expression
evaluated at µs) and the derivative from the right (the second expression evaluated at µs).
Finally, given that W(µ) is increasing as argued above, an unemployed worker will clearly




b − c(s) + λ(θ)s







where µm is an unemployed worker’s reservation match quality implicitly deﬁned by
W(µm) = U. (25)
Comparing the asset equation of a worker at match quality µm and that of an unemployed
worker, it is clear that
su = s(µm) (26)
µm = b − w. (27)
3.2.3 Firm side
Again, given that there is a unique wage in the stationary equilibrium as argued above, the
wage w can be dropped as a state variable from the value of employment for the ﬁrm. The
value of being a ﬁrm with a match of tenure τ is then
J(τ) =
  ¯ µ
µ
J(µ)dHτ(µ) (28)
where Hτ(µ) is the distribution of match quality for a match of tenure τ. J(µ) in turn





p − w + λ(θ)s(µ) ¯ F(µ)(V − J(µ)) + δ(V − J(µ)) if µ ≤ µs
p − w + δ(V − J(µ)) if µ > µs
. (29)
13The ﬂow payoﬀ of a match to the ﬁrm is p − w. In addition, the ﬁrm needs to take into
account that the match might end for exogenous reasons at rate δ and endogenously if the
worker decides to move to another job, where the latter happens at rate λ(θ)s(µ) ¯ F(µ). Since
endogenous turnover is decreasing with µ (and becomes zero once µ > µs), the value of a
match to the ﬁrm increases in µ.
The Bellman equation characterizing the value of a vacancy can be expressed as
rV = −cf + η(θ)Pa
  ¯ µ
µ
(J(µ) − K − V )dH0(µ), (30)
where Pa is the probability that a match is accepted by the worker. Given the free-entry






r+δ+λ(θ)s(µ) ¯ F(µ) if µ ≤ µs
p−w






  ¯ µ
µm
(J(µ) − K)dH0(µ). (32)
3.2.4 Equilibrium distribution of workers
Next, I turn to the derivation of G(µ), which denotes the stationary measure of employed
workers below match quality µ, and u, which is the stationary unemployment rate. Clearly,
the support of G is [µm,µ] and G(µ) = 1 − u.
In the model, the stationary measure of unemployment can be derived from equating the
ﬂow into and out of unemployment




δ + λ(θ)s(µm) ¯ F(µm)
. (34)
To determine the distribution G(µ), one can equate the ﬂow into and out of G(µ) (just as
in the Burdett and Mortensen (1998) model). The ﬂow into the pool of employed workers
with match quality µ or lower is
uλ(θ)s(µm)( ¯ F(µm) − ¯ F(µ)), (35)







The inﬂow clearly consists only of unemployed workers, while the outﬂow consists of workers
that separate exogenously, and workers that ﬁnd a match that is better than µ, where one
has to take into account that only workers below match quality µs are searching.
Equating these two ﬂows when µ ≤ µs means











Diﬀerentiating both sides with respect to µ and rearranging gives
G
′(µ) =
uλ(θ)s(µm) ¯ F(µm) − δG(µ)




For µ > µs the same steps give
G
′(µ) =





These diﬀerential equations together with the boundary condition in G(µm) = 0 fully char-
acterize the distribution of workers.
15Given the distribution G, the ﬁrm’s initial belief that a match of quality µ ≥ µm is accepted











where Pa is the probability that a worker accepts a match, which can be written as
Pa =
  ¯ µ
µ
A(µ)f(µ)dµ, (42)
163.3 Summary of equilibrium conditions
For the numerical exercise below, it is useful to note that two parameters, c1 and m0 can
be eliminated from the equilibrium conditions. In other words, two more normalizations are
possible. Let then ˆ s(µ) = s(µ)c
1
1+ρ
1 , ˆ λ = λc
− 1
1+ρ









. Then the complete
set of equilibrium conditions can be rewritten as























ˆ λ ¯ F(µ)ˆ s(µ)1−ρ
(1 + ρ)ρ
 
r + δ + ˆ λˆ s(µ) ¯ F(µ)
  (45)
µm = b − w. (46)
0 = ˆ cfˆ λ
α
1−α −
  ¯ µ
µm
(J(µ) − K)A(µ)f(µ)dµ (47)
0 = β
  ¯ µ
µm
J(µ)A(µ)f(µ)dµ − (1 − β)
  ¯ µ
µm










uˆ λˆ s(µm) ¯ F(µm)−δG(µ)
δ+ˆ λˆ s(µ) ¯ F(µ)
f(µ)
¯ F(µ) if µ ≤ µs
uˆ λˆ s(µm) ¯ F(µm)−δG(µ)
δ
f(µ)




δ + ˆ λˆ s(µm) ¯ F(µm)
. (51)






r+δ+ˆ λˆ s(µ) ¯ F(µ) if µ ≤ µs
p−w









r+δ+ˆ λˆ s(µ′) ¯ F(µ′)dµ′ if µ ≤ µs
W(µs) +
µ−µs
r+δ if µ > µs
(52)
174 Representative simulations
In this section, I simulate the above economy, and look at what happens when I change the
aggregate productivity parameter p and the exogenous job destruction rate δ.
For the distribution of match qualities, I use a normal distribution with mean zero and
variance 1. For the choice of the other parameters, unless otherwise mentioned, I follow
Shimer (2004) as closely as possible, to facilitate direct comparison of the results. The
model is set to generate quarterly series, so r is chosen to be 1.2%, giving an annual discount
rate of 4.8%. The aggregate productivity is chosen to be p = 5, implying that in terms of
the total payoﬀ from production, the probability of drawing a match quality that is a half
as important as output (i.e. equal to 2.5) is 0.62%. Of course, the endogenous distribution
of match qualities ﬁrst-order stochastically dominates the distribution of the draw of match
qualities, which is standard normal, so the question of how important match quality is
compared to output is determined endogenously. The value of leisure or of unemployment
insurance, b, is set to 2.5 at 50% of the match output. This is higher than the number
used by Shimer (2004) (he uses 40%), but recall that in this model the ﬂow payoﬀ from
unemployment is b less the cost of search, where this cost is strictly positive in this model,
while it is 0 in Shimer’s work. In fact, taking into account the search cost, the ﬂow payoﬀ
from unemployment is less than 40% of output. The exogenous job destruction rate is set
to 6%.
The cost of posting a vacancy is set to 2.5% of output, though recall that this number is
aﬀected by the normalization of c1 and m0. The ﬁxed cost of creating a match is set to 10,
or 2 periods of output. The ﬁxed cost of search for a worker is set close to 0 at 0.001, though
even such a small ﬁxed cost leads to no more search once the 70th percentile in the quality
distribution is reached. The parameter ρ is set equal to 0.2.




18with elasticity with respect to unemployment α of 0.62. The workers’ share of the expected
surplus is also set to equal 0.62.




fraction of unemployed searchers 18.13%
fraction of unemployed new hires 30.61%
job-to-job transition rate 2.057 %
wage rate 4.185
lowest accepted match quality -1.685 ( ¯ F = 95.40%)
search threshold match quality 0.417 ( ¯ F = 33.83%)
average match quality 0.504
4.1 Comparative statics results — aggregate productivity
Next, I allow aggregate productivity to vary. As stated earlier, I rely on comparisons of
stationary equilibria to assess the response of the model to aggregate shocks. In the standard
search model such a comparative static exercise invariably gives results that are very close
to the dynamic response of the full stochastic model. This is due to the fact that transition
dynamics are very swift in the standard model due to the forward-looking and instantaneous
adjustment of the vacancy-unemployment ratio and the resulting high job-ﬁnding rate. Due
to the presence of on-the-job search, the full stochastic version of the model of this paper
is much more complex. In particular, the complete distribution of match qualities across
employed workers enters the state space, and hence the dynamics become more gradual. This
is due to the fact that the vacancy-unemployment ratio does not adjust instantaneously to its
new long-run value, and while the job-ﬁnding rate of unemployed workers is equally high as
in the standard model, that is not true of the job-to-job transition rate of employed workers,
and hence the adjustment towards the new steady state could be much more prolonged.
191% increase productivity
stationary equil. value elasticity
unemployment rate 9.20% -5.44
vacancy rate 0.351 3.63
fraction of unemployed searchers 17.18% -5.23
fraction of unemployed new hires 29.71% -2.92
job-to-job transition rate 2.12 % 3.19
wage rate 4.234 1.18
lowest accepted match quality -1.734 ( ¯ F = 95.86%) -2.93
search threshold match quality 0.426 ( ¯ F = 33.50%) 2.24
average match quality .5102 1.32
These simulations show that on-the-job search and job-to-job transitions vary positively with
aggregate productivity shocks when comparing stationary equilibria for diﬀerent aggregate
productivity levels.
The ampliﬁcation mechanism embedded in the model shows up clearly when considering the
response of the unemployment and the vacancy rate to changes in aggregate productivity. In
the standard model, as Shimer (2004) has shown, the elasticity of the vacancy-unemployment
ratio with respect to labor productivity (which in the standard model is equal to market
tightness) is below 2 for reasonable parameter values. Here, the elasticity of the vacancy-
unemployment ratio is 9.07, which is both due to the decline in unemployment (elasticity of
−5.44) and to an increase in the vacancy rate (elasticity of 3.63).5
5With regards to the level of the vacancy rate, recall again that these numbers correspond to the normal-
ization where c1 = 1 and m0 = 1. Varying these parameters — which do not have clear equivalents in the
data — would result in varying the level of the vacancy rate, but not its elasticity.
204.2 Comparative statics results — destruction shocks
1% decline in destruction
stationary equil. value elasticity
unemployment rate 9.35% -3.92
vacancy rate 0.348 2.85
fraction of unemployed searchers 17.42% -3.91
fraction of unemployed new hires 29.89% -2.37
job-to-job transition rate 2.10 % 2.29
wage rate 4.19 0.13
lowest accepted match quality -1.6904 ( ¯ F = 95.45%) -0.31
search threshold match quality 0.432 ( ¯ F = 33.50%) 3.50
average match quality .5141 2.11
In these simulations the vacancy-unemployment ratio varies negatively with job destruction
shocks and with the unemployment rate. Shimer (2004) argues that destruction shocks
induce a positive correlation between vacancies and unemployment rate in the standard
model, thereby causing the vacancy-unemployment ratio to have a positive elasticity with
respect to adverse destruction shocks. That conclusion no longer holds up in this model in
the presence of job-to-job movements. This brings back destruction shocks into the picture















µ ≥ µs (55)





Hm(µ)ωT if µ ≤ µs
Hn(µ)(1 − ωT) if µ > µs
(56)
where ω0 = H0(µs). Applying Bayes’s rule, the diﬀerential equation for the evolution of ωT
is
˙ ωT = −ηωT(1 − ωT), (57)
where η is the rate at which workers below match quality µs ﬁnd better matches. Solving
the diﬀerential equation in Equation (57) gives
ωT =
ω0
ω0 + eηT(1 − ω0)
. (58)
Clearly, ωT is decreasing in T, hence HT ﬁrst-order stochastically dominates H0. This in
turn means that a ﬁrm is always willing to continue a relationship at the initial wage.
Corollary 4. There is a single wage in equilibrium.
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